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Abstract. Not in an estimated DSGE model of the US economy, once we account for the
fact that most of the high-frequency volatility in wages appears to be due to noise, rather
than to variation in workers￿preferences or market power.
1. Introduction
Between 1954 and 2009, average GDP growth in the U.S. was 3:2 percent per quarter at
an annual rate, with a standard deviation of 3:8 percent. The origin of these ￿ uctuations in
economic activity is still a matter of debate. Even more controversial is the extent to which
these ￿ uctuations re￿ ect the e¢ cient responses of economic agents to changes in fundamen-
tals, as opposed to departures from the e¢ cient allocation of resources. This distinction
matters because in the ￿rst instance stabilization policy cannot improve welfare, while in the
second, policy intervention could be bene￿cial.
We make two contributions to this debate. First, we show that a sizable fraction of the
output ￿ uctuations experienced by the U.S. economy in the postwar period represents changes
in its degree of ine¢ ciency, rather than movements of the e¢ cient frontier. Second, we ￿nd
that a signi￿cant reduction in these ine¢ cient output ￿ uctuations would have been compatible
with more stable in￿ ation, and would have thus resulted in higher welfare. This is because
the policy trade-o⁄ between real and nominal stabilization is quantitatively negligible in our
model economy.
Our results are based on an estimated dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE)
model, which is built around neoclassical growth foundations, but assumes that ￿rms and
workers enjoy some monopoly power and cannot set prices freely every period. Relative to
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an environment with perfect competition (and ￿ exible prices), these New-Keynesian features
distort the economy￿ s equilibrium away from the e¢ cient allocation. This distortion manifests
itself in the form of markups of goods prices over nominal marginal cost and of real wages
over the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure. These markups vary
over time due to exogenous movements in market competitiveness, and to the stickiness of
prices and wages.
We summarize the evolution of these distortions by measuring the distance between actual
GDP and the GDP that would emerge in equilibrium if markups were constant at their
steady state level. We call this counterfactual object potential GDP. This is also the level
of output that would be observed in an economy identical to ours, but with ￿ exible prices
and wages, and no exogenous variation in the degree of competition. In our model, potential
GDP is below its e¢ cient level￿ the one that would be observed if markets were perfectly
competitive￿ since markups are positive in steady state. However, potential and e¢ cient
output share identical log-linear dynamics. Therefore the output gap￿ the di⁄erence between
actual and potential GDP￿ is a useful summary statistic of the movements of the economy
away from its e¢ cient frontier. According to our estimates, the output gap is pro-cyclical
and often quite large, with a standard deviation of 2:5 percentage points. From this evidence,
we conclude that movements in the economy￿ s degree of ine¢ ciency contributed signi￿cantly
to postwar ￿ uctuations.
Does the existence of ine¢ cient output ￿ uctuations imply that stabilization policy was
suboptimal over our sample? In general, the answer is no, since our economy features multi-
ple distortions that result in a complex trade-o⁄ between the stability of the output gap and
other policy objectives. Most notably, the stabilization of the output gap produces dispersion
in the cross-section of prices and wages, which in the aggregate manifests itself as in￿ ation.
For example, the exogenous ￿ uctuations in desired markups due to changes in market com-
petitiveness give agents with the chance to adjust their prices a reason to do so, even when
the output gap is zero, thus creating a discrepancy between newly set prices and the existing
ones. Price dispersion, in turn, produces dispersion in markups and in the supply of goods
and labor, which is ine¢ cient because workers and ￿rms are identical and the technology
that aggregates their inputs is concave. As a result, producing the potential level of output
in the actual economy requires more work than in the counterfactual economy with stable
markups. Stated more formally, the full potential allocation, in which markups are constantIS THERE A TRADE-OFF BETWEEN INFLATION AND OUTPUT STABILIZATION? 3
across agents and time, is infeasible in our model. Therefore, policymakers must trade-o⁄
the stabilization of output around potential with that of price and wage in￿ ation.1
To evaluate quantitatively the signi￿cance of this trade-o⁄ in our estimated model, we
compute its optimal allocation, focusing in particular on optimal output. This is the coun-
terfactual level of output that would have been observed in the post-war U.S. economy if
the nominal interest rate had been set so as to maximize the utility of the model￿ s represen-
tative agent, rather than following the interest rate rule we estimate. The main ￿nding of
this exercise, and the central result of the paper, is that optimal and potential output move
closely together, and that this near stabilization of the output gap is roughly consistent with
the stabilization of wage and price in￿ ation. The surprising implication is that stabilization
policy appears to face a negligible trade-o⁄ among its three main objectives and that much
of the ine¢ cient variation in output uncovered by our estimates could have been eliminated,
increasing welfare at the same time.
The key to this ￿nding is our treatment of wages in the estimation of the model. Unlike
in most empirical DSGE exercises, exempli￿ed for instance by the seminal work of Smets
and Wouters (2007), we match the model￿ s wage variable with two measures of hourly labor
income, allowing for errors in their measurement, along the lines of Boivin and Giannoni
(2006a) (see also Gali, Smets, and Wouters (2011)). As a result, most of the high frequency
variation that characterizes the individual series on compensation used in estimation is not
interpreted as implausibly large variation in the monopoly power of workers. It is instead
recognized as measurement error or, more generally, as a mismatch between the data and the
model￿ s wage concept.
This shift in the interpretation of the factors behind the observed high frequency move-
ments in wages￿ from markup shocks to measurement errors￿ produces a model that is eco-
nomically more plausible, empirically more successful, and with radically di⁄erent normative
implications. Indeed, in models estimated with only one wage series, the extreme volatility
of wage markup shocks generates an optimal output that is signi￿cantly more volatile than
actual output. This destabilization of output is the price policymakers must pay to obtain
1 In environments with ￿ exible wages, no markup shocks and no capital accumulation, the stabilization
of the output gap and of aggregate markups are equivalent and produce no price dispersion, thus delivering
the e¢ cient allocation. This is what Blanchard and Gal￿ (2007) call the ￿divine coincidence￿ . See Woodford
(2003) or Gali (2008) for a textbook treatment. In our environment, output gap and markup stabilization
are not equivalent, due to the presence of capital accumulation. As a result, the policy tradeo⁄ is not only
between output and in￿ ation stabilization, but also involves the composition of demand between consumption
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the desired stabilization of wages, whose dispersion is extremely costly for the representative
agent. We present an example of a model of this kind in section 6. In contrast, this extreme
tension between output and wage stabilization is virtually absent in the baseline model with
multiple wage indicators, where the variation in wage markups is negligible. In fact, in
this model, the deviation of the optimal from the potential allocation is altogether minimal,
leading to our conclusion that monetary policymakers face a negligible con￿ ict among their
objectives.
One important quali￿cation to the absence of a signi￿cant policy trade-o⁄is that it depends
on the maintained assumption that the low frequency variation in labor supply identi￿ed
by the model, and re￿ ected in the behavior of hours worked, is mostly due to shifts in
households￿attitudes towards work in the market. If these secular changes in hours were
interpreted instead as coming from a trend in workers￿monopoly power, our inference on
the movements of the economy￿ s e¢ cient frontier￿ and therefore the output gap￿ would
change signi￿cantly, as also illustrated by Sala, S￿derstr￿m, and Trigari (2010). However,
the properties of the optimal equilibrium, and of optimal output in particular, are barely
a⁄ected by this alternative interpretation. This suggests that the lack of identi￿cation of
labor supply shocks has only a minor impact on the normative implications of the model.
This paper is related to a large literature on the estimation of DSGE models (e.g. Rotem-
berg and Woodford (1997), Lubik and Schorfheide (2004), Boivin and Giannoni (2006b),
Smets and Wouters (2007)). Some of these papers explicitly assume that monetary policy
reacts to the di⁄erence between actual and potential output, but do not focus on the model￿ s
predictions regarding the behavior of the output gap. A number of studies, such as Levin,
Onatski, Williams, and Williams (2005), Nelson (2005), AndrØs, L￿pez-Salido, and Nelson
(2005) and Edge, Kiley, and Laforte (2008), have tackled this issue more directly, but have
found by and large that it is di¢ cult to obtain model-based estimates of the output gap
with reasonable cyclical properties. In comparison, our DSGE output gap is more consistent
with conventional views of the business cycle, and broadly in line with the estimates of Sala,
Soderstrom, and Trigari (2008), who were the ￿rst to obtain a cyclical output gap in an esti-
mated DSGE model. In this positive dimension, our work is closely related to Gali, Gertler,
and Lopez-Salido (2007), who also measure the extent of ine¢ cient ￿ uctuations, but do so
through the lens of the labor wedge, rather than of the output gap.IS THERE A TRADE-OFF BETWEEN INFLATION AND OUTPUT STABILIZATION? 5
However, our main contribution is not to ￿nd a more reasonable output gap than in pre-
vious studies, but rather to interpret this object from a more explicit normative perspective.
In this dimension, we make contact with the optimal policy literature in medium-scale DSGE
models (e.g. Levin, Onatski, Williams, and Williams (2005), Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004)
and Schmitt-GrohØ and Uribe (2007)). As these authors, we ￿nd that nominal dispersion is
key for the normative implications of the model. Unlike them, however, we ￿nd virtually no
tension between in￿ ation and output gap stabilization, once we recognize that wage markup
shocks are likely to be small. The important role of wage markup shocks and labor supply
shocks more in general relates our work to Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2009) and Sala,
S￿derstr￿m, and Trigari (2010), although they are not concerned with the characterization
of optimal policy.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the details of the theoretical
model and section 3 describes the approach to measurement and inference. Sections 4 and
5 present our estimates of potential and optimal output, while sections 6 and 7 analyze the
role of labor supply shocks in the results. Section 8 concludes.
2. The Model Economy
This section outlines our baseline model of the U.S. business cycle, which is similar to
Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005) and Smets and Wouters (2007). It is a medium-
scale DSGE model with a neoclassical growth core, augmented with several shocks and
￿frictions￿ ￿ departures from the simplest assumptions on tastes, technology and market
structure￿ now common in the literature.
The economy is populated by ￿ve classes of agents: producers of a ￿nal good, intermediate
goods producers, households, employment agencies and a government. We now present their
optimization problems.
2.1. Final good producers. At every point in time t, perfectly competitive ￿rms produce
the ￿nal good Yt by combining a continuum of intermediate goods fYt(i)gi, i 2 [0;1], accord-
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Pro￿t maximization and the zero pro￿t condition imply that the price of the ￿nal good, Pt,


















The curvature of the aggregator ￿p;t determines the degree of substitutability across in-
termediate goods in the production of the ￿nal good and hence the elasticity of demand for
each of these intermediates, as shown in (2.1). We model ￿p;t as an the exogenous stochastic
process
log(1 + ￿p;t) ￿ ￿p;t = (1 ￿ ￿p)￿p + ￿p￿p;t￿1 + "p;t,
driven by innovations "p;t distributed i:i:d:N(0;￿2
p). We refer to these innovations as price
markup shocks, since, according to Lerner￿ s formula, ￿p;t is the desired net markup of price
over marginal cost for intermediate ￿rms. Therefore, ￿p;t is also a measure of the (lack of)
competitiveness in the intermediate goods market and its exogenous movements are one of
the forces driving the ￿ uctuations of the economy away from its e¢ cient frontier.
2.2. Intermediate goods producers. A monopolist produces the intermediate good i us-
ing the production function
(2.2) Yt(i) = A1￿￿
t Kt(i)￿Lt(i)1￿￿ ￿ AtF,
where Kt(i) and Lt(i) denote the amounts of capital and labor employed by ￿rm i: Both of
these inputs are homogenous and F is a ￿xed cost of production, chosen so that pro￿ts are
zero in steady state (see Rotemberg and Woodford, 1995 or Christiano, Eichenbaum, and
Evans, 2005).
At represents exogenous labor-augmenting technological progress or, equivalently, a neutral
technology factor. The level of neutral technology is non-stationary and its growth rate
(zt ￿ ￿logAt) follows an AR(1) process
zt = (1 ￿ ￿z)￿ + ￿zzt￿1 + "z;t,
with "z;t i:i:d:N(0;￿2
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As in Calvo (1983), every period a fraction ￿p of intermediate ￿rms cannot optimally choose




where ￿t ￿ Pt
Pt￿1 is gross in￿ ation and ￿ is its steady state. This indexation scheme implies
no price dispersion in steady state: Therefore, the level of ￿ is inconsequential for welfare,
which allows us to abstract from the challenging question of the optimal level of in￿ ation (see
Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2010) for a recent survey.) In addition, full indexation produces a
vertical Phillips curve in the long-run, so that the steady state level of output is independent
from that of in￿ ation, regardless of policy. As a consequence, monetary policy cannot bring
the economy closer to its e¢ cient frontier on average, even if this shift might be desirable.
The remaining fraction of ￿rms choose their price, ~ Pt(i), by maximizing the present dis-






















subject to the demand function 2.1 and the production function 2.2. In this objective, ￿t+s
is the marginal utility of nominal income of the representative household that owns the ￿rm,
while Wt and rk
t are the nominal wage and the rental rate of capital.
2.3. Employment agencies. Firms are owned by a continuum of households, indexed by
j 2 [0;1]. Each household is a monopolistic supplier of specialized labor, Lt(j); as in Erceg,
Henderson, and Levin (2000). A large number of competitive ￿employment agencies￿combine










As in the case of the ￿nal good production, the elasticity of this aggregator ￿w;t corresponds
to the desired markup of wages over households￿marginal rate of substitution between con-
sumption and leisure. Unlike for the price markup shock, which is an AR(1) process, we
assume instead that log(1 + ￿w;t) ￿ ￿w;t is i:i:d:N(0;￿2
w); for reasons explained in the next
subsection. We refer to ￿w;t as the wage markup shock.8 ALEJANDRO JUSTINIANO, GIORGIO E. PRIMICERI, AND ANDREA TAMBALOTTI



















is the wage paid by intermediate ￿rms for the homogenous labor input sold to them by the
agencies.












where Ct is consumption and h is the degree of habit formation. The disturbance to the
discount factor bt is an intertemporal preference shock and follows the stochastic process
logbt = ￿b logbt￿1 + "b;t,
with "b;t ￿ i:i:d:N(0;￿2
b). The disturbance to the disutility of labor ’t is instead an intratem-
poral preference or labor supply shock, as in Hall (1997). This shock enters households￿￿rst
order conditions for the optimal supply of labor in exactly the same way as the wage markup
shock. As a consequence, these two disturbances are not separately identi￿ed in this model,
when only using data on wages and total hours.2 However, the implications of these two
shocks for the evolution of potential output di⁄er markedly, as also pointed out by Chari,
Kehoe, and McGrattan (2009) and Sala, S￿derstr￿m, and Trigari (2010).






’ + ￿’ log’t￿1 + "’;t,
with "’;t ￿ i:i:d:N(0;￿2
’). The autocorrelation of the taste shock ’t; which distinguishes
it from the i:i:d: wage markup shock ￿w;t, re￿ ects the prior view that taste shocks are
a more plausible device to capture the e⁄ects on hours worked of changes in labor force
2 Gal￿ (2010) and Gali, Smets, and Wouters (2011) propose a reinterpretation of this same model with an
explicit treatment of unemployment, in which the two shocks can be separately identi￿ed. For a DSGE model
with similar implications, but alternative microfoundations of unemployment, see Christiano, Trabandt, and
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participation and other low-frequency movements largely unrelated to the business cycle, but
are nonetheless evident in our data. We will return to the observational equivalence of these
two shocks and to its normative implications in sections 7, where we show that reinterpreting
the estimated labor disutility shocks as markup shocks is instead inconsequential for the
properties of optimal output.
Since technological progress is non stationary, utility is logarithmic to ensure the existence
of a balanced growth path. Moreover, consumption is not indexed by j because the existence
of state contingent securities ensures that in equilibrium consumption and asset holdings are
the same for all households.
As a result, the household￿ s ￿ ow budget constraint is
PtCt + PtIt + Tt + Bt ￿ Rt￿1Bt￿1 + Qt(j) + ￿t + Wt(j)Lt(j) + rk
t ut ￿ Kt￿1 ￿ Pta(ut) ￿ Kt￿1,
where It is investment, Bt is holdings of government bonds, Rt is the gross nominal interest
rate, Qt(j) is the net cash ￿ ow from household￿ s j portfolio of state contingent securities, ￿t
is the per-capita pro￿t accruing to households from ownership of the ￿rms and Tt is lump-sum
taxes and transfers.
Households own capital and choose the capital utilization rate, ut, which transforms phys-
ical capital into e⁄ective capital according to
Kt = ut ￿ Kt￿1.
E⁄ective capital is then rented to ￿rms at the rate rk
t . The cost of capital utilization is a(ut)




1+￿ , as in Levin, Onatski,
Williams, and Williams (2005), such that in steady state, u = 1, a(1) = 0 and ￿ ￿
a00(1)
a0(1) . In
the log-linear approximation of the model solution this curvature is the only parameter that
matters for the dynamics.
The physical capital accumulation equation is








where ￿ is the depreciation rate. The function S captures the presence of adjustment costs
in investment, as in Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005), and we parameterize it as
S (It=It￿1) =
￿
2 (It=It￿1 ￿ e￿)
2. In steady state, S = S0 = 0 and S00 = ￿ > 0. This coe¢ cient
is also the only one that matters for the log-linear dynamics. The investment shock ￿t is a
source of exogenous variation in the e¢ ciency with which the ￿nal good can be transformed10 ALEJANDRO JUSTINIANO, GIORGIO E. PRIMICERI, AND ANDREA TAMBALOTTI
into physical capital, and thus into tomorrow￿ s capital input. Justiniano, Primiceri, and
Tambalotti (2010) show that this variation might stem from technological factors speci￿c to
the production of investment goods, as in Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Krusell (1997), but also
from disturbances to the process by which these investment goods are turned into productive
capital. The investment shock follows the stochastic process
log￿t = ￿￿ log￿t￿1 + "￿;t,
where "￿;t is i:i:d:N(0;￿2
￿):
As in Erceg, Henderson, and Levin (2000) , every period a fraction ￿w of households cannot




The remaining fraction of households chooses instead an optimal wage by maximizing their
utility, subject to the labor demand function 2.4.
2.5. Monetary and government policies. When estimating the model and characterizing
its positive properties, such as the behavior of potential output, we assume that the short-
term nominal interest rate follows a feedback rule, of the type that has been found to provide
a good description of actual monetary policy in the United States at least since Taylor (1993).
Our speci￿cation of this policy rule features interest rate smoothing, a systematic response
to deviations of annual in￿ ation from a time varying in￿ ation target, and to deviations of













































where R is the steady state gross nominal interest rate and "R;t is an i:i:d: N(0;￿2
R) monetary
policy shock.
The in￿ ation target ￿￿
t evolves exogenously according to the process
log￿￿
t = (1 ￿ ￿￿)log￿ + ￿￿ log￿￿
t￿1 + "￿;t,
with "￿;t ￿ i:i:d:N(0;￿2
￿): The primary role of this in￿ ation target is to account for the very
low frequency behavior of in￿ ation (Ireland (2007)), which would otherwise imply a highIS THERE A TRADE-OFF BETWEEN INFLATION AND OUTPUT STABILIZATION? 11
degree of backward price indexation (Cogley and Sbordone (2008)). We choose to minimize
this source of in￿ ation persistence because it a⁄ects signi￿cantly the relationship between
in￿ ation and welfare, but it does not appear to be supported by the micro evidence on ￿rms￿
pricing behavior.
When characterizing optimal policy, of course, this rule is ignored, and we assume that the
central bank sets the interest rate so as to directly maximize the utility of the representative
agent.
Fiscal policy is Ricardian. The government ￿nances its budget de￿cit by issuing short term








where the government spending shock gt follows the stochastic process
loggt = (1 ￿ ￿g)logg + ￿g loggt￿1 + "g;t,
with "g;t ￿ i:i:d:N(0;￿2
g).
3. Model Solution and Estimation
This section brie￿ y describes the solution and estimation of the model. The ￿rst step in
the solution consists of rewriting the equilibrium conditions in terms of deviations of the real








denote the collection of these equilibrium conditions, in which ￿t, "t and ￿ are the vectors
of endogenous variables, exogenous i.i.d. disturbances and unknown structural coe¢ cients
respectively. To obtain an estimate of our two main objects of interest, potential and optimal
GDP, (3.1) must also include the equilibrium conditions of the corresponding counterfactual
economies with stable markups and optimal monetary policy, and ￿t must also contain all the
variables necessary to characterize the dynamics of these counterfactual economies, including
potential and optimal output.
We then log-linearize (3.1) around the non-stochastic steady state and solve the result-
ing linear system of rational expectation equations by standard methods (for example Sims
(2001)). This procedure yields the following system of transition equations
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where the ￿hat￿denotes log deviations from the steady state, ^ ￿t is an extended version of ^ ￿t
that also includes the expectational variables that are necessary to characterize the solution
of the model, and G(￿) and M (￿) are conformable matrices whose elements are functions of
￿.
3.1. Data and Measurement. We estimate the model using eight series of U.S. quarterly
data: the in￿ ation rate, the nominal interest rate, the logarithm of per-capita hours, the log-
di⁄erence of real per-capita GDP, consumption and investment, and two measures of nominal
hourly wage in￿ ation.
The in￿ ation rate is the quarterly log di⁄erence of the GDP de￿ ator, while the nominal
interest rate is the e⁄ective Federal Funds rate. We measure per-capita hours as the number
of hours worked in the total economy, divided by the civilian non-institutional population
(16 years and older).3 The series of hours for the total economy exhibits a less pronounced
low frequency behavior than that for the non-farm business sector, because it accounts better
for sectoral shifts, as shown by Francis and Ramey (2009). Real per-capita GDP is nominal
GDP divided by population and the GDP de￿ ator. The real series for per-capita consumption
and investment are obtained in the same manner. Consumption corresponds to the sum of
non-durables and services, while investment is constructed by adding consumer durables to
total private investment, all in nominal terms.
As pointed out in the introduction, we match the wage variable in the model, Wt, with two
data series, following the methodology proposed by Boivin and Giannoni (2006a) and recently
also adopted by Gali, Smets, and Wouters (2011). The ￿rst series is nominal compensation
per hour in the total economy, from NIPA. The second measure is the ￿average hourly
earnings of production and non-supervisory employees,￿which is computed by the Bureau of
Labor Statistics from the Establishment Survey, and is the one preferred by Gal￿ (2010). We
assume that both series are imperfect measures of the wage in the model, and allow each of
them to be a⁄ected by an i.i.d. observation error. Finally, we normalize to one the coe¢ cient
relating the model￿ s wage to the ￿rst series, while we estimate the loading (￿) on the other
series, as standard in factor analysis. We will return to the reasons for this approach to the
measurement of wages, and to its positive and normative implications in section 6.
3 We are grateful to Shawn Sprague, of the Bureau of Labor Statistics, for providing the data on hours and
the labor share in the total economy. Breaks in the civilian population series due to census-based population
adjustments are smoothed by splicing them uniformly over a 10-year window.IS THERE A TRADE-OFF BETWEEN INFLATION AND OUTPUT STABILIZATION? 13
Denoting by dt the vector of the observable series at time t, we link it to the corresponding
variables in the model through the system of observation equations
(3.3) dt = H (￿)^ ￿t + d(￿) + et,
where et is a Gaussian i:i:d: measurement error that only enters the equations corresponding
to the two wage series. The estimation sample starts in 1964:II, due to limited availability of
the wage data, and ends in 2009:IV. We do not demean or detrend any series.
3.2. Bayesian Inference and Priors. We characterize the posterior distribution of the
model￿ s coe¢ cients by combining the likelihood function with prior information (see An and
Schorfheide (2007) for a survey of Bayesian estimation of DSGE models). The likelihood
function can be evaluated by applying the Kalman Filter to the linear and Gaussian state
space representation of the model, given by the state equation (3.2) and the measurement
equation (3.3). Conditional on the sample information, the Kalman ￿lter and smoother can






which include potential and optimal output. In the rest of this section we brie￿ y discuss the
speci￿cation of the priors, which is reported in Table 1.
Two parameters are ￿xed using level information not contained in our dataset: the quar-
terly depreciation rate of capital (￿) to 0:025 and the steady state ratio of government spend-
ing to GDP (1￿1=g) to 0:2, which corresponds to the average value of Gt=Xt in our sample.
Also due to lack of identi￿cation, we set the steady state net wage markup to 25 percent.
The priors on the other coe¢ cients are fairly di⁄use and broadly in line with those adopted
in previous studies, such as Smets and Wouters (2007) and Del Negro, Schorfheide, Smets,
and Wouters (2007).
The prior distribution of all but two persistence parameters is a Beta, with mean 0:6 and
standard deviation 0:2. The two exceptions are the autocorrelation of TFP shocks￿ whose
prior is centered at 0:4, since this process already includes a unit root￿ and the autocorrela-
tion of the in￿ ation target shock, which we ￿x at 0:995. This value re￿ ects the view that
the exogenous movements of the in￿ ation target should account for the very low frequency
behavior of in￿ ation. In reduced form, these secular movements might re￿ ect the slow evolu-
tion of policymakers￿beliefs and the consequent changes in the conduct of monetary policy,
as suggested for instance by Cogley and Sargent (2004) and Primiceri (2006).14 ALEJANDRO JUSTINIANO, GIORGIO E. PRIMICERI, AND ANDREA TAMBALOTTI
The intertemporal preference, price and wage markup shocks are normalized to enter with
a unit coe¢ cient in the consumption, price in￿ ation and wage equations respectively (see
appendix A for details). The priors on the standard deviations of the innovations to these
normalized shocks are quite disperse and chosen to generate volatilities for the variables they
impact directly broadly in line with those in the data. The covariance matrix of the vector
of shocks is diagonal.
3.3. Posterior Estimates of the Parameters. Table 1 summarizes the posterior estimates
of the parameters in our baseline speci￿cation. The data are quite informative about these
parameters and the estimates we obtain are generally in line with those of previous studies.
For this reason, and given the focus of our paper on the implications of these estimates
for the ine¢ ciency of the economy, and for optimal policy, we only brie￿ y comment on the
coe¢ cients related to nominal rigidities and to monetary policy. The posterior distributions
of the parameters ￿p and ￿w imply that prices and wages are re-optimized approximately
every year and every three quarters respectively, while ￿p and ￿w indicate very low levels of
backward indexation. As for monetary policy, it is fairly inertial, with ￿R around 0:7, and
it exhibits a substantial degree of activism, with interest rates responding with a long-run
coe¢ cient of more than 2 to in￿ ation and of almost 1 to output growth.
4. Potential Output and the Output Gap
With an estimated structural model in hand, we are now ready to explore the relationship
between the actual economy, as observed over the past ￿fty years, and its unobserved e¢ -
cient frontier, as inferred from the model. In our environment, the observed macroeconomic
outcomes deviate from those under perfect competition, and thus from e¢ ciency, due to the
presence of monopoly power in goods and labor markets. This monopoly power, which stems
from the imperfect substitutability of intermediate goods and of specialized labor services,
allows ￿rms to price their output above marginal cost and households to price their labor
above the marginal rate of substitution.
In the aggregate, these markups create a wedge in the intratemporal e¢ ciency condition,
the equality of the marginal rates of substitution (MRS) and transformation (MRT) betweenIS THERE A TRADE-OFF BETWEEN INFLATION AND OUTPUT STABILIZATION? 15
Table 1. Prior distributions and posterior parameter estimates in the baseline model.
Prior Posterior
Dist Mean SE Mode Mean SE 5% Median 95%
￿ Capital share N 0.30 0.05 0.16 0.16 0.01 0.15 0.16 0.17
￿p Price indexation B 0.50 0.15 0.15 0.16 0.07 0.06 0.15 0.29
￿w Wage indexation B 0.50 0.15 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.08
￿ SS tech. growth N 0.50 0.03 0.47 0.47 0.02 0.43 0.47 0.51
h Habit formation B 0.60 0.10 0.80 0.82 0.04 0.75 0.82 0.88
￿p SS price markup N 0.15 0.05 0.25 0.25 0.04 0.18 0.25 0.32
logLss SS log hours N 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.01 0.49 -0.79 0.00 0.80






Discount factor G 0.25 0.10 0.17 0.18 0.05 0.10 0.18 0.27
￿ Inverse Frisch G 2.00 0.75 2.36 2.73 0.76 1.62 2.67 4.12
￿p Price stickiness B 0.66 0.10 0.84 0.84 0.03 0.79 0.84 0.89
￿w Wage stickiness B 0.66 0.10 0.72 0.73 0.04 0.66 0.73 0.80
￿ Elasticity util. cost G 5.00 1.00 5.10 5.31 1.01 3.77 5.25 7.08
S
00
Invest. adj. costs G 4.00 1.00 3.64 3.93 0.78 2.73 3.87 5.30
￿￿ Reaction in￿ . N 1.70 0.30 2.35 2.32 0.21 1.97 2.33 2.66
￿X Reaction GDP gr. N 0.40 0.30 0.82 0.85 0.14 0.63 0.84 1.10
￿ Loading coe⁄. N 1.00 0.50 0.65 0.65 0.03 0.59 0.65 0.70
￿R Auto. mp B 0.60 0.20 0.69 0.70 0.05 0.60 0.70 0.77
￿z Auto. tech. B 0.40 0.20 0.13 0.13 0.06 0.04 0.13 0.23
￿g Auto. gov. spending B 0.60 0.20 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.99 1.00 1.00
￿￿ Auto. investment B 0.60 0.20 0.69 0.69 0.05 0.60 0.69 0.77
￿p Auto. price markup B 0.60 0.20 0.25 0.28 0.15 0.08 0.25 0.56
￿’ Auto. labor supply B 0.60 0.20 0.98 0.97 0.01 0.95 0.98 0.99
￿b Auto. intertemporal B 0.60 0.20 0.68 0.63 0.08 0.49 0.64 0.76
100￿R Std mp IG1 0.15 1.00 0.22 0.22 0.01 0.20 0.22 0.25
100￿z Std tech. IG1 1.00 1.00 0.86 0.87 0.05 0.79 0.86 0.95
100￿g Std gov. spending IG1 0.50 1.00 0.36 0.36 0.02 0.34 0.36 0.40
100￿￿ Std investment IG1 0.50 1.00 6.98 7.56 1.46 5.39 7.45 10.17
100￿p Std price markup IG1 0.15 1.00 0.17 0.16 0.02 0.12 0.16 0.19
100￿’ Std labor supply IG1 1.00 1.00 3.86 4.73 1.58 2.88 4.49 7.23
100￿b Std intertemporal IG1 0.10 1.00 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.05
100￿w Std wage markup IG1 0.15 1.00 0.05 0.06 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.09
100￿￿ Std in￿ ation target IG1 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.05 0.01 0.04 0.05 0.07
100￿1;mew Std meas. error 1 IG1 0.15 1.00 0.49 0.49 0.03 0.45 0.49 0.55
100￿2;mew Std meas. error 2 IG1 0.15 1.00 0.28 0.28 0.02 0.24 0.28 0.3216 ALEJANDRO JUSTINIANO, GIORGIO E. PRIMICERI, AND ANDREA TAMBALOTTI


















where we used the fact that the nominal marginal cost MCt = Wt=MPLt; and the marginal
product of labor MPLt is also the marginal rate of transformation between labor and ￿nal
consumption (see also Gali, Gertler, and Lopez-Salido (2007)).
The equilibrium price and wage markups, ￿
p
t and ￿w
t , vary over time for two reasons. First,
exogenous shifts in the substitutability of goods and labor services, and thus in the elasticity
of their demand, a⁄ect ￿rms and workers￿market power and desired markups. These shifts
are captured by the stochastic processes ￿p;t and ￿w;t. The second source of equilibrium
markup variation depends on the presence of nominal rigidities, which prevent ￿rms and
workers from achieving their desired markups at any given point in time. The resulting
movements in average markups are endogenous and can be triggered by any shock hitting
the economy.
Given these distortions, we de￿ne potential output as the counterfactual level of output that
would be observed if equilibrium price and wage markups were constant at their (positive)
steady state levels ￿p and ￿w.4 This level of output would occur in equilibrium if prices
and wages were ￿ exible, and desired markups did not vary over time. Observe that potential
output is the same as e¢ cient output￿ equilibrium output in a competitive economy￿ up to
a shift in the steady state that has no implications for the approximate log-linear dynamics.5
The reason for focusing on potential rather than on e¢ cient output is that the current version
of our model abstracts from distortions that are likely to be particularly relevant in steady
4 In the model, there is a small discrepancy between output and GDP, due to the presence of capital
utilization costs. In the text, we sometimes refer to GDP as ￿output,￿even if this usage is slightly imprecise.
5 The dynamic equivalence between the potential and e¢ cient economies requires that the ￿xed cost F
does not change with the degree of competition. If F; which is introduced in the model to ￿absorb￿ the
steady state pro￿ts generated by monopolistic competition, is assumed to vanish as the economy becomes
competitive, and those pro￿ts go to zero, the dynamic properties of the e¢ cient equilibrium will be a⁄ected.
However, we veri￿ed that this e⁄ect is quantitatively small, so we ignore it here.IS THERE A TRADE-OFF BETWEEN INFLATION AND OUTPUT STABILIZATION? 17
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Figure 1. GDP, potential GDP and the output gap in the baseline model.
In panel (b), the blu line is the median of the posterior distribution of the
output gap, while the four shades of green denote 60, 70, 80, and 90 percent
posterior probability intervals.
state, such as taxes. Incorporating these other distortions into the analysis of the model￿ s
steady state, and also of its dynamics, is an important avenue for future research.
Figure 1a plots the logarithm of U.S. GDP and the posterior median of potential output
from the DSGE model. The latter is on average somewhat more stable than actual output,
especially starting in the mid-eighties, but it also displays sizable ￿ uctuations. To focus more
closely on cyclical variation, Figure 1b plots the posterior distribution of the model-implied
output gap, which is simply the di⁄erence between output and the DSGE-based measure of
potential. The shaded areas correspond to the NBER recessions. The DSGE-based output
gap displays a pronounced cyclical behavior: it peaks at the end of most expansions and
declines during recessions.18 ALEJANDRO JUSTINIANO, GIORGIO E. PRIMICERI, AND ANDREA TAMBALOTTI
More speci￿cally, ￿gure 1b shows that the output gap declined steadily during the ￿twin￿
recessions of the early 1980s, which brought the economy back to its potential equilibrium
after the ￿overheating￿of the 1970s, particularly evident towards the end of that decade.
This evolution of the output gap is consistent with the conventional wisdom that points
to the importance of monetary and other nominal factors in driving real macroeconomic
outcomes during that historical period. However, the level of the output gap remains positive
throughout the two recessions, given the record levels it had reached just prior to the Volcker
disin￿ ation. Our estimates also indicate a slightly negative gap during most of the 1990s,
implying that actual output was relatively slow in catching up with a surge in potential.
This historical reconstruction squares well with the view that this period was characterized
by a considerable acceleration in productivity. Finally, we observe that the last recession
is associated with a substantial fall in output relative to the DSGE-based potential. This
decline is driven by large negative investment shocks, whose origin can be traced to ￿nancial
disturbances further propagated by nominal rigidities, as argued in Justiniano, Primiceri,
and Tambalotti (2010).
The pattern of deviations of GDP from potential just described implies that output ￿ uctua-
tions in the postwar period would have been less pronounced if markets had been competitive.
To quantify this statement, we focus on business cycle dynamics and decompose the deviation
of GDP from a Hodrick-Prescott (HP) trend into two parts: the deviations of potential GDP
and of the output gap from their respective HP trends. This is an exact decomposition, since
the HP ￿lter is linear and thus additive. Figure 2 shows the results of this exercise. First,
note how the business cycle component of the DSGE gap peaks and troughs close to the
NBER dates, with some delay in the last three ￿slow￿recoveries. Second, the decomposition
highlights that the DSGE model￿ s estimate of potential output is roughly consistent with
the Real Business Cycle view of ￿ uctuations, in the sense that its e¢ cient frontier displays
movements over the business cycle of similar magnitude to those of actual output (the cor-
relation between detrended potential and output is equal to 0:75).6 This volatility in the
e¢ cient frontier, however, coexists with a substantial volatility of the HP-detrended output
gap, which is about 70 percent of that of detrended GDP (the correlation between the de-
trended gap and output is equal to 0:23). This evidence is the basis for our ￿rst important
6 Our neutral technology shock has a smaller impact on ￿ uctuations than in the RBC literature, due to
the presence of investment adjustment costs and to a low estimate of the elasticity of labor supply. However,
other shocks are also responsible for movements in the economy￿ s e¢ cient frontier.IS THERE A TRADE-OFF BETWEEN INFLATION AND OUTPUT STABILIZATION? 19












Figure 2. GDP, potential GDP and the output gap in the baseline model, HP ￿ltered.
conclusion, that time variation in the economy￿ s degree of ine¢ ciency is a crucial factor in
macroeconomic ￿ uctuations.
This conclusion is consistent with the evidence in Gali, Gertler, and Lopez-Salido (2007)
and Sala, Soderstrom, and Trigari (2008), but stands in contrast to the results of many other
studies in the empirical DSGE literature, as pointed out by Walsh (2005) and Mishkin (2007).
This literature has typically estimated small DSGE output gaps, with little cyclical variation,
but its ￿ndings can often be traced back to modeling assumptions that seem at odds with
the data. For example, AndrØs, L￿pez-Salido, and Nelson (2005) calibrate the coe¢ cient
of backward price indexation to one and do not include in their model markup shocks or
any other disturbance that directly a⁄ects the Phillips curve. With these tight restrictions,
marginal costs are forced to explain the high frequency ￿ uctuations in the ￿rst di⁄erence
of in￿ ation. To make this possible, the slope of the Phillips curve must be quite large,
erroneously suggesting that nominal rigidities are nearly irrelevant for cyclical ￿ uctuations.
Edge, Kiley, and Laforte (2008) instead estimate a large scale model, with data starting in20 ALEJANDRO JUSTINIANO, GIORGIO E. PRIMICERI, AND ANDREA TAMBALOTTI
the early 1980s, but without an in￿ ation target shock. Since the in￿ ation rate exhibits a
pronounced downward trend during this period, the inferred output gap inherits a similar
trend. Finally, Levin, Onatski, Williams, and Williams (2005) detrend the real series prior
to estimation, and assume that monetary policy responds directly to the output gap. Since
their estimate of the output gap is small and countercyclical, this policy rule is at odds with
the observed behavior of the Federal Reserve. If we impose the same restrictions assumed by
these authors on our model, we can approximately replicate their results.
5. Optimal Output and the (Lack of a) Policy Trade-Off
The previous section documented sizable movements in the degree of ine¢ ciency of the U.S.
economy in the last ￿fty years. Why did stabilization policy not counteract these ine¢ cient
￿ uctuations? One possible reason is that these movements in the output gap represent the
price policymakers had to pay to minimize other distortions. And indeed, in our economy,
policymakers face a trade-o⁄ between output gap stabilization, on the one hand, and price
and wage stabilization, on the other.
This trade-o⁄ stems from the fact that, in the equilibrium in which output is stabilized
around potential, desired prices and wages￿ those that agents would set in the absence of
nominal rigidities￿ are in general not constant. For example, desired prices change mechani-
cally in response to changes in desired markups due to markup shocks. A more subtle reason
for movements in desired prices is the coexistence of price and wage stickiness. With sticky
wages, an increase in the marginal product of labor, due for example to an increase in pro-
ductivity, will result in a fall in ￿rms￿marginal costs, and hence in their desired price, since
wages cannot fully adjust to absorb the productivity shock (Erceg, Henderson, and Levin
(2000)).
Due to these movements in desired prices, workers and ￿rms that reprice at di⁄erent times
will charge di⁄erent prices. The resulting cross-sectional price and wage dispersion, whose
movements over time go hand in hand with instability in price and wage in￿ ation, is ine¢ cient,
since it forces workers and ￿rms with identical tastes and technologies to supply di⁄erent
amounts of hours and of intermediate goods. Given that the aggregation of these inputs into
aggregate utility and ￿nal output is concave, society would be better o⁄ if production and
labor e⁄ort were shared equally across agents.IS THERE A TRADE-OFF BETWEEN INFLATION AND OUTPUT STABILIZATION? 21
We can illustrate the ine¢ ciency of an asymmetric distribution of the intermediate goods
supply caused by price dispersion by aggregating the production functions (2.2) across ￿rms

















is a measure of price dispersion. Increases in price dispersion have the same e⁄ect as a fall in
aggregate productivity, lowering the output of the ￿nal good, for any given level of the inputs.
A similar dispersion term for wages directly reduces the utility of the average household, for
any given level of the homogenous labor input Lt, due to the concavity of the labor aggregator
(2.3).
To summarize, a stable output gap is in general incompatible with the absence of cross-
sectional dispersion in prices and quantities in the intermediate goods and labor market,
and therefore with stable price and wage in￿ ation. As a result, stabilization policy faces a
trade-o⁄ between these three objectives. In fact, in our economy, unlike in that of Erceg,
Henderson, and Levin (2000) for instance, optimal policy needs to balance more than just
these three goals, due to the presence of capital accumulation, and of all the other ￿frictions￿
needed to improve the model￿ s ability to ￿t the data.
For a more comprehensive and quantitative insight into these trade-o⁄s, we turn to the
numerical study of the model￿ s optimal equilibrium. This is computed by maximizing the
utility of the average household, subject to the constraints represented by the optimal behav-
ior of private agents, following the approach developed by Benigno and Woodford (2006) (see
also Schmitt-GrohØ and Uribe (2007) or Christiano, Ilut, Motto, and Rostagno (2010)). In
the optimization, we assume that the short-term nominal interest rate is the only instrument
available to the planner, which thus de￿nes this problem as one of optimal monetary policy.
Figure 3a compares actual, potential and optimal output. To do so in a parsimonious
way, and to maintain comparability with ￿gure 1 above, actual and optimal output are both
presented in deviation from potential output. Figure 3b and c plot instead observed price
and wage in￿ ation, as well as their counterfactual evolution under the optimal policy. The
picture speaks for itself. Optimal and potential output move extremely closely together￿ the22 ALEJANDRO JUSTINIANO, GIORGIO E. PRIMICERI, AND ANDREA TAMBALOTTI
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Figure 3. Optimal output, price and wage in￿ ation in the baseline model.
optimal output gap is virtually zero at all times￿ but this stabilization of the output gap
is also consistent with a signi￿cant reduction in the volatility of price and, especially, wage
in￿ ation. The surprising implication of these ￿ndings, and the central result of the paper,
is that stabilization policy appears to have faced a negligible trade-o⁄ among its three main
objectives over our sample, and that much of the ine¢ cient variation in output documented
in section 4 could have been avoided, while at the same time reaping the bene￿t of more
stable in￿ ation.
6. Wage Markup Shocks: Fact or Fiction?
The key to the absence of a signi￿cant trade-o⁄ between output and in￿ ation stabilization
documented above is the treatment of wages in the estimation of the model. As described
in section 3.1, and following the general methodology proposed by Boivin and Giannoni
(2006a), our estimation procedure uses two wage series in the measurement equation, with
the assumption that each series matches only imperfectly the model￿ s concept of ￿the wage￿ .IS THERE A TRADE-OFF BETWEEN INFLATION AND OUTPUT STABILIZATION? 23














Figure 4. Two measures of nominal wage in￿ ation.
As shown in ￿gure 4, these two series behave similarly at medium and low frequencies, but dif-
fer markedly at high frequencies, re￿ ecting some conceptual di⁄erences in what they attempt
to measure, and more in general the well-known di¢ culties in measuring aggregate wages
(e.g. Abraham, Spletzer, and Stewart (1999), Bosworth and Perry (1994)). Given these
large high-frequency discrepancies, the use of two wage indicators helps to distinguish idio-
syncratic measurement errors￿ high frequency wage movements uncorrelated across the two
indicators￿ from macroeconomic factors, which should produce ￿ uctuations in both series.
To highlight the importance of this measurement choice, this section presents estimates of
our model based on only one wage series with no measurement error, as in most empirical
DSGE exercises.7 Table 2 reports the posterior estimates for this alternative empirical spec-
i￿cation, which are generally very similar to those for the baseline. Two relevant exceptions
are steady state in￿ ation (which in the baseline is a⁄ected by the lower mean of the in￿ ation
7 We use the NIPA series of hourly compensation for the total economy, which is the more volatile of the
two. This choice of data also allows us to estimate the model on a longer sample, starting in 1954. The typical
estimation of DSGE models (for example Smets and Wouters (2007)) is conducted using compensation per
hour in the non-farm business sector, which is even more volatile.24 ALEJANDRO JUSTINIANO, GIORGIO E. PRIMICERI, AND ANDREA TAMBALOTTI
rate in the compensation series), and the persistence of the price markup shock, which is now
substantially higher.
The crucial di⁄erence in the estimates, however, is that the standard deviation of the wage
markup shock is now almost six times larger than in the baseline. In addition, the variance
decomposition of the model reveals that the explanatory power of this shock is large for
wage in￿ ation, especially at high frequencies, but very small for the real variables.8 These
observations, combined with the dubious microfoundations of these shocks (Chari, Kehoe, and
McGrattan (2009), Shimer (2009)), suggest that they are likely to re￿ ect mostly measurement
error, rather than large variations in workers￿monopoly power from one quarter to the next.
The extreme volatility of wage markup shocks in the model with only one wage measure,
which we argued is empirically implausible, also has very misleading normative implications.
This is because these large shocks directly a⁄ect workers￿desired wages, thus generating wide
dispersion in relative wages when nominal adjustments are staggered. Given the large welfare
costs due to wage dispersion, the planner is willing to pay a high price to reduce it as much as
possible. Figure 5a shows that, in this model estimated with a single wage series, this price
is paid in the form of extremely volatile optimal output, which is consistent with Rotemberg
and Woodford (1999). To reduce the variability of wage and price in￿ ation, as shown in
￿gures 5b and c; the planner must accept a path for optimal output that is signi￿cantly more
volatile than that of actual output, at both business cycle and higher frequencies.
The striking implication of our calculations is that, in this case, optimal policy should have
de-stabilized aggregate real activity, in order to reduce the volatility of price and, especially,
wage in￿ ation. In comparison, recall that this tension between output and in￿ ation stabiliza-
tion virtually disappears in the model with multiple wage indicators, in which the variation
in wage markups is negligible.
Figure 6 con￿rms that the excess volatility of optimal output in this model is due to
implausibly large wage markup shocks. The three panels plot GDP, price and wage in￿ ation
in the optimal allocation of an economy identical to the one depicted in Figure 5, but in which
the wage markup shocks have been (arbitrarily) set to zero. In this economy, the deviations
of optimal output from potential are much smaller than in ￿gure 5, and more in line with
8 Wage markup shocks explain only 2 percent of GDP and hours volatility over the business cycle and 1
percent of consumption and investment.IS THERE A TRADE-OFF BETWEEN INFLATION AND OUTPUT STABILIZATION? 25
Table 2. Prior distributions and posterior parameter estimates in the model with only
one observable wage series (compensation).
Prior Posterior
Dist Mean SE Mode Mean SE 5% Median 95%
￿ Capital share N 0.30 0.05 0.17 0.17 0.01 0.16 0.17 0.18
￿p Price indexation B 0.50 0.15 0.05 0.06 0.03 0.03 0.06 0.11
￿w Wage indexation B 0.50 0.15 0.08 0.08 0.03 0.04 0.08 0.13
￿ SS tech. growth N 0.50 0.03 0.49 0.49 0.02 0.45 0.49 0.53
h Habit formation B 0.60 0.10 0.84 0.84 0.03 0.78 0.84 0.89
￿p SS price markup N 0.15 0.05 0.29 0.29 0.04 0.23 0.29 0.35
logLss SS log hours N 0.00 0.50 0.03 0.04 0.49 -0.76 0.04 0.86






Discount factor G 0.25 0.10 0.12 0.13 0.04 0.07 0.13 0.20
￿ Inverse Frisch G 2.00 0.75 1.96 2.32 0.69 1.32 2.24 3.56
￿p Price stickiness B 0.66 0.10 0.77 0.78 0.03 0.73 0.78 0.83
￿w Wage stickiness B 0.66 0.10 0.73 0.74 0.05 0.66 0.74 0.81
￿ Elasticity util. cost G 5.00 1.00 4.95 5.17 1.03 3.61 5.10 6.97
S
00
Invest. adj. costs G 4.00 1.00 3.58 3.86 0.74 2.73 3.81 5.16
￿￿ Reaction in￿ . N 1.70 0.30 2.10 2.17 0.20 1.86 2.17 2.51
￿X Reaction GDP gr. N 0.40 0.30 0.94 0.94 0.13 0.73 0.94 1.17
￿R Auto. mp B 0.60 0.20 0.78 0.78 0.03 0.73 0.78 0.82
￿z Auto. tech. B 0.40 0.20 0.08 0.09 0.04 0.03 0.09 0.18
￿g Auto. gov. spending B 0.60 0.20 1.00 0.99 0.00 0.99 0.99 1.00
￿￿ Auto. investment B 0.60 0.20 0.74 0.72 0.05 0.63 0.73 0.81
￿p Auto. price markup B 0.60 0.20 0.90 0.88 0.05 0.78 0.88 0.95
￿’ Auto. labor supply B 0.60 0.20 0.98 0.98 0.01 0.96 0.98 0.99
￿b Auto. intertemporal B 0.60 0.20 0.44 0.45 0.11 0.28 0.45 0.64
100￿R Std mp IG1 0.15 1.00 0.21 0.22 0.01 0.20 0.22 0.24
100￿z Std tech. IG1 1.00 1.00 0.92 0.93 0.05 0.85 0.93 1.01
100￿g Std gov. spending IG1 0.50 1.00 0.37 0.37 0.02 0.34 0.37 0.40
100￿￿ Std investment IG1 0.50 1.00 7.03 7.69 1.37 5.66 7.55 10.13
100￿p Std price markup IG1 0.15 1.00 0.10 0.10 0.01 0.08 0.10 0.12
100￿’ Std labor supply IG1 1.00 1.00 2.99 3.53 1.09 2.11 3.35 5.55
100￿b Std intertemporal IG1 0.10 1.00 0.06 0.06 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.09
100￿w Std wage markup IG1 0.15 1.00 0.30 0.30 0.02 0.27 0.30 0.33
100￿￿ Std in￿ ation target IG1 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.0626 ALEJANDRO JUSTINIANO, GIORGIO E. PRIMICERI, AND ANDREA TAMBALOTTI
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Figure 5. Optimal output, price and wage in￿ ation, in the model with only
one observable wage series (compensation).
those in the baseline model. The same is true for price and wage in￿ ation, although the
former is somewhat more volatile. This is because, in the one-wage model, the unconditional
volatility of price markup shocks is higher than in the baseline estimation.
The conclusion we draw from these experiments is that ignoring measurement error in
wages might lead to the erroneous normative implication that the output-in￿ ation stabiliza-
tion trade-o⁄is substantial, and that, among their con￿ icting objectives, policymakers should
prioritize the stabilization of wage in￿ ation, even if this choice entails destabilizing output.
7. The Interpretation of Labor Supply Shocks
As illustrated in section 2, the wage markup and labor disutility shocks are in general
observationally equivalent in our empirical framework, and the only way to disentangle them is
to posit a priori that they have di⁄erent spectral pro￿les and hence contribute to ￿ uctuations
at di⁄erent frequencies. This is the approach we have followed, by assuming that the wage
markup shock is i:i:d:, while the labor disutility shock is a fairly persistent AR(1) process.IS THERE A TRADE-OFF BETWEEN INFLATION AND OUTPUT STABILIZATION? 27
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Figure 6. Optimal output, price and wage in￿ ation in the model with only
one observable wage series (compensation) and no wage markup shocks.
This identi￿cation strategy captures the idea that the large low frequency variation in labor
supply identi￿ed by the model is mostly attributable to shifts in households￿preferences for
market work, such as the secular change in attitudes towards female labor participation that
started in the 1960s, or other slow moving demographic developments. However, if we were to
attribute all or part of this low frequency variation in hours to changes in the competitiveness
of the labor market, our estimate of potential output would change signi￿cantly, since this
shock directly a⁄ects the distance of the economy from its e¢ cient frontier.
Figure 7 illustrates this point quantitatively, by comparing the estimates of potential out-
put arising from two alternative interpretations of the source of low frequency ￿ uctuations in
hours, as in Sala, S￿derstr￿m, and Trigari (2010). The ￿rst interpretation corresponds to our
baseline assumption that these low frequency movements are mainly due to labor disutility
shocks. Under the alternative interpretation, there are no taste shocks, and the low-frequency
￿ uctuations in hours originate from changes in the monopoly power of workers, which do not28 ALEJANDRO JUSTINIANO, GIORGIO E. PRIMICERI, AND ANDREA TAMBALOTTI








Figure 7. E⁄ect of alternative assumptions on the origin of labor supply
shocks on potential and optimal GDP. The blue line represents the di⁄erence
between potential output in the model with all wage markup shocks and the
baseline model with both wage markup and disiutility of labor shocks. The
red dashed line represents the di⁄erence in optimal outputs across the same
two models.
a⁄ect the e¢ cient equilibrium.9 The solid line in Figure 7 represents the di⁄erence between
the estimates of potential output under the two scenarios. This di⁄erence is very large￿
ranging from ￿10 to +15 percent￿ but most of its variation is at low frequencies. This
should not be too surprising, given that the shifts in the disutility of labor we estimate must
be highly persistent and very large to explain the wide secular swings in total hours observed
in the sample.
We just showed that the behavior of potential output changes considerably with respect
to our baseline estimates under the extreme assumption that labor supply shocks only re￿ ect
changes in workers￿market power. However, this is not the case for optimal output, as seen
9 Given the observational equivalence of these two alternative assumptions, the model does not need to be
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from the dashed line in ￿gure 7, which depicts the di⁄erence between the estimates of optimal
output under the two alternative scenarios. This di⁄erence is an order of magnitude smaller
than that between the estimates of potential. Optimal output is relatively invariant to the
source of labor supply shifts because the planner has a strong distaste for wage dispersion,
and thus chooses a very stable path for wage in￿ ation , as in the baseline case of section 5.
As a result, quantities￿ hours and output in particular￿ bear the brunt of the adjustment to
labor supply shocks in the optimal equilibrium, regardless of these shocks￿origin.
According to the results in ￿gure 7, the output gap is subject to large swings in the optimal
equilibrium if labor supply shocks re￿ ect changes in workers￿market power. Consequently,
the policy trade-o⁄between real and in￿ ation stabilization is signi￿cant in this case. However,
the fact that most of the variation in the output gap is concentrated at low frequencies, and
is caused by changes in market power, suggests that monetary policy might not be the most
appropriate tool to address this distortion, and that more targeted ￿scal or microeconomic
policies could be more e⁄ective in eliminating it.
Moreover, the fact that optimal output is roughly invariant in the two scenarios considered
in ￿gure 7 implies that researchers interested in characterizing the equilibrium implications
of optimal policy do not need to take a strong stance on the ultimate sources of labor supply
shocks, an issue that remains unsettled in the literature (e.g. Gali, Smets, and Wouters
(2011) and Christiano, Trabandt, and Walentin (2010)). One consequence of this ￿nding is
that medium scale New-Keynesian models like the one presented here might be more useful
for policy analysis than suggested for instance by Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2009).
8. Conclusions
We estimated a New-Neoclassical Synthesis model of the U.S. economy. In this model,
workers and ￿rms have some monopoly power, and markups of price over marginal cost and of
wages over the marginal rate of substitution ￿ uctuate due to exogenous changes in monopoly
power, as well as to the presence of sticky prices and wages. According to our estimates, the
movements in these markups were associated with large ￿ uctuations in U.S. GDP away from
its e¢ cient frontier. Moreover, we ￿nd that monetary policy could have virtually eliminated
these ine¢ cient output movements, reducing at the same time the volatility of price and wage
in￿ ation, and thus achieving an improvement in welfare for the model￿ s representative agent.30 ALEJANDRO JUSTINIANO, GIORGIO E. PRIMICERI, AND ANDREA TAMBALOTTI
The key factor driving this surprising absence of a meaningful trade-o⁄ between output
(gap) and in￿ ation stabilization in our model is that we estimate little exogenous variation
in desired wage markups, unlike in most previous empirical DSGE studies. This is because
we match the model￿ s ￿wage￿with two measures of earnings and compensation, which allows
us to better isolate high frequency idiosyncrasies speci￿c to each series, from a common
component that is more likely to represent genuine macroeconomic factors. Indeed, the same
model estimated with only one wage series ￿nds implausibly large high frequency ￿ uctuations
in desired wage markups, which generate a strong tension between output and in￿ ation
stabilization. In this model, optimal policy would be forced to resolve this con￿ ict by inducing
higher output volatility than observed in the data, in order to obtain a smoother path of
in￿ ation.
Our results point to a signi￿cant discrepancy between the model￿ s equilibrium under his-
torical monetary policy, as described by the estimated interest rate rule, and the optimal
equilibrium. What are the reasons for this discrepancy? One possibility is that the model￿ s
welfare function is not a good representation of the actual objectives of U.S. monetary policy.
For example, wage distortions loom large in the utility of the representative agent in the
model, but they are seldom mentioned as a direct preoccupation by policymakers. A second
possibility is that we might have overlooked some relevant constraint in setting interest rates.
The most obvious one in this respect is the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates. How-
ever, a preliminary exploration of this issue suggests that this bound is not violated often in
the optimal equilibrium. Finally, actual monetary policy might have been misguided, at least
at some points in the past. This is a fairly common conclusion among researchers, especially
for the period roughly between 1965 and 1980 (e.g. Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000), Cogley
and Sargent (2004) and Primiceri (2006)). The fact that we assume an invariant policy rule
across the entire span of our long sample prevents us from addressing this possibility with
￿ner historical detail, although doing so would be useful.
Appendix A. Normalization of the Shocks
As in Smets and Wouters (2007), some of the exogenous shocks are re-normalized by a
constant term. In particular, we normalize the price and wage markups shocks and the
intertemporal preference shock.IS THERE A TRADE-OFF BETWEEN INFLATION AND OUTPUT STABILIZATION? 31
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These normalizations are chosen so that these shocks enter their equations with a coe¢ cient
of one. In this way, it is easier to choose a reasonable prior for their standard deviation.
Moreover, the normalization is a practical way to impose correlated priors across coe¢ cients,
which is desirable in some cases. For instance, imposing a prior on the standard deviation
of the innovation to ^ ￿
￿
p;t corresponds to imposing priors that allow for correlation between ￿
and the standard deviation of the innovations to ^ ￿p;t. Often, these normalizations improve
the convergence properties of the MCMC algorithm.
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